As research on leaders matures, a next step is a better understanding of the advisers who surround them. This paper explores the often-hidden politics of leader-adviser interactions, focusing on how leaders strategically manage elite cues from within their own circle that could engage otherwise dormant or permissive public opinion. Advisers can serve as cue-givers when leaders contemplate the use of force, but leaders can shape which cues reach the public by accommodating advisers. The paper explores this argument by combining a survey experiment with a case study of the 2009 escalation in Afghanistan, illustrating how the dynamics identified in the experiment motivate the president to bargain with advisers whose support or opposition
in order to strategically manage elite cues from within their own circle that could engage otherwise dormant or permissive public opinion, as well as cue other significant elites such as members of Congress.
The paper also advances arguments about elite leadership of mass opinion by theorizing the political origins of elite support for war. Although the importance of elite consensus or dissensus is central to these arguments (e.g. Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2009 ), the origins of the configuration of elite cues is rarely discussed. I argue that voters delegate foreign policy to elites, and wait for a cue to alert them-"fire alarm"-style-that it is time to pay attention (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Zaller 2003) . But this process of delegation provides strategic incentives for the chief executive, who can try to prevent the fire alarm from being pulled in the first place by accommodating elites. This process may require concessions to other elite preferences that affect the substance of policy even if the public is not clamoring for a policy shift in the same direction or if the details remain largely out of public view. Leaders may therefore have relative autonomy in whether they initiate or even escalate the use of force, but at the price of political capital or concessions on the nature, strategy, or timing of military operations.
Focusing on the United States, this paper addresses the sometimes-hidden politics that go on within an administration. Advisers-which, in the US context, I define to include White House staff such as the National Security Adviser and cabinet members or even deputies, as long as they are of sufficiently high rank to influence policy and attract media attention-can serve as potential cue-givers when leaders contemplate the use of force, and thus are likely to be the target of a leader's attempt to accommodate them. Leaders are most concerned about cues that reveal information-notably, surprising or costly cues that can credibly inform voters (Gelpi 2010; Baum and Groeling 2010, 27-28; Trager and Vavreck 2011, 532) . This surprise can arise in two ways: first, from the institutional position of the cue-giver (here, cues from inside the administration), or second, from the substantive nature of the cue (such as information that goes against the speaker's or president's perceived "type"). The theory suggests that these imperatives lead Democratic presidents to accommodate hawkish advisers and shift policy accordingly, while Republican presidents are most concerned about their most dovish advisers.
I test the argument using a two-pronged approach, combining a survey experiment designed to show which cues from advisers would affect public attitudes towards war and thus would most concern presidents, with a brief case study of Barack Obama's decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan in December 2009, illustrating how the dynamics identified in the experiment shape presidential behavior. The experiment illuminates political costs that leaders work hard to avoid, i.e. that are "off the equilibrium path." In the real world, we should expect leaders to focus their bargaining energy-and political capital-on managing those elites whose cues would have the strongest effects on public opinion. The results suggest asymmetric effects:
hawkish advisers have the greatest political relevance for presidents of both parties, but Democratic presidents are at greater political risk from these hawkish advisers. Dovish advisers primarily affect Republican presidents.
The elite-level implications address an important point about the external validity of survey experiments. The effects that would be generated among the public if the elite cues in the experiment reached the public's ears motivate the president to bargain with those elites whose support or opposition would sway public opinion the most. The most damaging cues found in survey experiments may end up diminished in volume or may not reach the public at all, whereas helpful cues could be magnified. The real-world effects that relate to the experiment may thus be found inside the (proverbial) Situation Room. The paper thus deepens both the "leader attribute" and "institutional leadership" schools by highlighting how leaders interact with those in their immediate advisory circle in ways that reflect both their own beliefs and previouslyoverlooked domestic constraints.
Leaders, Advisers, and Domestic Politics
The "pulling and hauling" of bureaucratic politics have frequently been invoked in scholarship on international security, particularly with respect to the use of force (Allison and Zelikow 1999) . But the bureaucratic politics model-which emphasizes the interactions between governmental elites-has been difficult to translate into specific predictions. Critics have argued that the bureaucratic politics approach is both too complex, and strangely lacking in politics. Bendor and Hammond (1992) argue that the model assumes, rather than demonstrates, the need for the president to bargain with his subordinates, whom he presumably chose. Other approaches to group decision-making, including theories of "groupthink" (Janis 1982) and "multiple advocacy" (George 1980) , likewise sidestep issues of selection and within-group politics. Bendor and Hammond (1992, 315-316) note, however, that political support outside the executive branch could be a reason presidents would need to bargain with appointees they select and over whom they have formal authority (see also Art 1973, 475) .
These critiques raise three sets of questions. First, is there likely to be a distribution of preferences within an administration, or at least some daylight between particular advisers, or between advisers and the president? Second, why would advisers speak out or leak if they are presumed to be loyal? Third, assuming advisers sometimes speak out, how do their statements affect domestic politics, and ultimately, policy?
Distribution of Advisers' Views
At first glance, it may seem odd for the president to consider the political implications of taking advice from those he chose to put in his own inner circle. But there are often significant, protracted debates within an administration over whether and how the United States should use military power. The divisions within the George W. Bush administration in the lead-up to the Iraq War are well-known. Such divisions also arose during the Cold War, when tension roiled the administrations of Jimmy Carter (Cyrus Vance vs. Zbigniew Brzezinski) and Ronald Reagan (George Shultz vs. Caspar Weinberger) . Furthermore, presidents also tout the advice or endorsement of particular advisers. In the Iraq case, the Bush administration exploited Powell's known skepticism, choosing Powell to make the now-infamous presentation to the UN to enhance the administration's "credibility" by going "counter to type" since "everyone knew that Powell was soft on Iraq, that he was the one who didn't want to go" (Woodward 2004, 291) .
Why might divisions arise within administrations? Although advisers and cabinet officials are chosen by the president, their views cannot be known on every issue, and some disagreement is natural. Leaders also engage with advisers to gather information, seek advice, and deliberate policy options. Thus they may actively seek a distribution of views to improve decision-making (along the lines of "multiple advocacy"), although the very political risks highlighted by this paper put limits on how wide this distribution is likely to be. Advisers are also chosen for their competence, their suitability for a particular organization, or their ability to balance another adviser. Donald Rumsfeld's appointment as Secretary of Defense, for example, was partly designed to balance Powell (Mann 2004, 264-269) . Advisers may also be appointed because they appease a wing of the party, as in the case of William Jennings Bryan's appointment as Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson (see Fenno 1959, 190-192) . Both parties have seen important splits on key foreign policy questions, including the use of force.
Thus even within a given administration, it is usually possible to array advisers on a spectrum that approximates a hawk-dove or activist-restraint divide.
Adviser Views in the Public Domain
Of course, if advisers' positions never become publicly known, the distribution of views inside an administration would not be politically relevant. But advisers' views often enter the public domain, both because there is likely to be demand in the media for these statements, and because advisers are likely to want to supply information (Kydd 1997, 137-138) . As Baum and Groeling (2010) show, the media is strategic, and seeks surprising or newsworthy information from the "most authoritative and high-ranking sources," as illustrated by frequent quotations from "senior administration officials" (Baum and Groeling 2010, 22 ; see also Hayes and Guardino 2013, 28) . The media oversamples "surprising" cues, notably criticism of the president by members of his own party, or support from the opposition party in Congress (Baum and Groeling 2010; Hayes and Guardino 2013) . Although work in this vein has emphasized Congress, the logic could also be extended to actors who operate within the president's administration. Leaks or public criticism from within an administration are particularly juicy and potentially damaging.
Advisers may also speak out to advance their own policy or personal agenda. Of course, administrations regularly tap advisers for media appearances or Congressional testimony to help generate support for the president's policies. But advisers may also have motives to air their views without permission. A significant motive is to influence policy. Airing their views can send signals not only to the public but also to other elite decision-makers or Congress, raising the domestic political stakes and generating leverage inside administration debates. Bureaucratic actors might also speak out for the sake of organizational prestige or budgets, or to manage their reputations and track records to further their own career aspirations. Appointing an adviser with political aspirations or from the opposite party is politically dangerous for the president because it gives a prominent figure with a separate political base and potentially conflicting motives access to insider information and a platform to air dissent.
One could argue that loyalty and potential personal or professional costs inhibit those who disagree with the president from speaking out. But leaks are a perennial issue for administrations, who in turn spend expend significant effort preventing or tracking them down.
Furthermore, firing an adviser may be more costly to the president than making policy concessions. Presidents work to avoid costly events like firings or resignations, so we are likely to observe few of them. Dissent can also take less dramatic but still-consequential forms, such as Congressional testimony that cues other elites.
How Adviser Cues Matter: The Political Origins of Elite Consensus
Assuming that advisers speak out, would their words have any effect? An important feature of public attitudes on foreign policy is that they can be susceptible to movement in the face of cues from elites. Elite cues provide the public with a short-cut to information-gathering, and such cues trigger, activate, or even shape public preferences, even in wartime (Zaller 1992, ch. 6; Berinsky 2009, ch. 5) . I argue that administration officials can provide cues that can shape public attitudes about the use of force. Advisers have credibility and information advantages arising from their position, and can provide cues that confirm or counter partisan stereotypes (such as a Democratic president's presumed dovish tendencies). These cues could influence not only the public, but also members of Congress, who may rely on elites from the administration or the military to provide information through testimony or classified briefings. Given that members of Congress are themselves important sources of elite cues for the public (Howell and Pevehouse 2007; Baum and Groeling 2010; Trager and Vavreck 2011) , an adviser's cue may be amplified. Advisers thus influence whether there is an overall elite consensus or dissensus, which in turn shapes public opinion and ultimately the political incentives and constraints on democratic leaders.
Still, observationally, major incidents of adviser disputes spilling into the public domain are relatively rare. I argue that these advisory politics are hidden because presidents work to keep key advisers happy, so that damaging cues are muted or helpful cues can be promoted.
This strategic behavior helps explains the origins of elite cues. Presidents can build support for a policy or insulate themselves from political damage by keeping elites on board or at least preventing elite dissent. This arrangement also suits the public, which can use elite cues as a monitoring device (Zaller 2003) . Leaders "remain wary of the 'dog that could bark'" if elite debate triggers public concern (Powlick and Katz 1998, 31) .
Which Cues Matter? Theoretical Expectations
As the president considers the messages flowing to the public and Congress, all elite cues are not created equal. It is usually unsurprising, for example, when an adviser hand-picked by the president supports a decision the president makes about the use of force. But in assessing whether adviser cues matter, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of an adviser's statement from other features of the situation. Does the public take other cues, such as the president's partisanship, into account? Many scholars have identified "party brand" effects, in which Democratic presidents, expected to embrace more dovish policies, are punished or mistrusted when they make peace or stay out of conflicts, while Republicans can face political headwinds when they fight (see, among others, Schultz 2005; Trager and Vavreck 2011; Mattes and Weeks 2016) . Furthermore, adviser statements may have countervailing effects themselves. If an adviser speaks out against a war the president is contemplating, is the effect on public opinion driven by the mere fact that a member of the president's own team spoke out, or does the statement's effect depend on whether the adviser has a hawkish or dovish reputation, or whether the president is a Democrat or Republican, such that the adviser's statement reinforces or confounds a party stereotype?
The literature on elite cues helps disentangle these effects and generate hypotheses for how adviser cues matter. Elite signals are most informative when they go against expectations, or when they are costly to the signaler (Baum and Groeling 2010, 27-28; Trager and Vavreck 2011, 532) . The literature highlights two ways that cues can credibly convey information, though they are rarely discussed jointly. First, a cue can be institutionally informative if it comes from an elite with a credible or surprising position. The backing of elites who are not expected to support the president (such as members of the opposition party) or the criticism of those within his own party will be more informative to voters and will attract more media attention (Baum and Groeling 2010) . Second, cues can be substantively informative if they convey information that runs contrary to expectations. One form of substantively surprising or costly cue-giving arises when partisan elites-particularly members of Congress-give cues that run counter to expectations of the party's brand. Trager and Vavreck (2011) , for example, find that out-party cues affect approval depending on the president's policy choice: for Democratic presidents, opposition support from Republicans in Congress is more beneficial when these presidents contemplate staying out of a crisis than when they fight, because Republican opposition support helps counter the image of dovish Democrats who may be staying out for ideological reasons. Similarly, Republican presidents who fight benefit from Democratic opposition support because it mitigates the image of an overly hawkish Republican leader.
Extending these arguments to those inside the administration, we can derive three mechanisms through which advisers could send informative signals. The first, and the main focus of the analysis, is based on their institutional status as advisers; the second two are based on the substance of the cue. Many decisions to use force unfold after a process of debate, at least part of which often airs publicly (perhaps deliberately, to gauge public or Congressional support). We can thus consider how adviser cues affect support for war ex ante, as well as approval of the president once he or she announces whether force will actually be used.
First, advisers have institutional credibility from their position on the president's team.
When the president considers a proposal for the use of force, a supportive statement from an adviser should have relatively little effect on public opinion, however, because advisers are expected to support the president (analogous to the argument that support from members of the president's party in Congress is expected and unsurprising, e.g. Baum and Groeling 2010, 25) .
But if an adviser opposes the proposal, support for force is likely to decrease even before a decision in announced, since openly opposing a proposal under discussion is surprising and somewhat costly to the speaker. If the president ultimately acts against the recommendation of advisers, either for or against force, presidential approval should be lower than if the president had made the same decision with full support, or at least no dissent.
H1a:
Adviser statements opposing the use of force will reduce support for war (prior to the president announcing a decision).
H1b: Presidents who act in opposition to their advisers will have lower approval than those who have their advisers' support.
While the advisers' institutional status distinguishes their cues from other potential sources of information, these effects may be influenced by the effects of the adviser's own reputation or the substance of what the adviser says. If an adviser makes a statement that is counter to his or her own type-an adviser from the hawkish end of the spectrum coming out in opposition to a war, or a dovish adviser coming out in favor-then the statement will be surprising, and more likely to generate movement in public opinion. There is some evidence that these counter-type signals can be informative even when the cue-givers are not legislators with clear political motives. For example, Dropp et al. (n.d.) have shown that the impact of military endorsements of the use of force is greater when the cue is surprising, as when the military opposes force, or when it supports humanitarian missions. Such counter-type statements by advisers should move opinion about the use of force more than true-to-type signals, which are more expected. Furthermore, presidents who act against counter-type signals risk a greater hit to their approval than if they buck advice from advisers who are conforming to type.
H2a: Adviser statements that run counter to type (e.g., a dovish adviser supporting the use of force, or a hawkish adviser opposing the use of force) will have a greater effect on public support for the use of force than true-to-type adviser statements, before a decision is announced.
H2b
: Presidents who act in opposition to advisers who make counter-type statements will suffer a greater approval penalty than those who act against the advice of advisers who conform to type.
H2a and H2b do not take the president's partisanship into account. The third mechanism, which draws on party brand effects, relates to how the adviser's statement reinforces or counters the partisanship of the president. Advisers with a hawkish reputation who support the use of force may make it harder for a Democratic president to stay out of a conflict, for example, because the hawkish adviser's support for war may signal that the war is necessary, and reinforce the stereotype of a Democrat as overly dovish if the president decides not to fight. Similarly, a relatively dovish adviser who opposes a Republican president's decision to fight could confirm the image of a Republican as too eager to use force (in line with Trager and Vavreck 2011) . These latter two mechanisms can interact, leading to hypotheses about how a particular adviser's endorsement (or criticism) would matter, given the president's partisanship. When presidents wish to act according to type-that is, when a Democratic president wants to avoid the use of force, or a Republican president wishes to fight-the most beneficial endorsement would be from a counter-type adviser: an adviser known to be hawkish endorsing a Democratic president's decision to stay out (or to choose a lower-level military option), or a dove endorsing a Republican president for escalating. Even when presidents act counter to type, a hawk endorsing a Republican president's decision to stay out or a dove endorsing a Democratic president who uses force would also be somewhat surprising. The costliest criticism would be from a like-minded adviser-an adviser known to be dovish criticizing a Democratic president, particularly for staying out, or a hawkish adviser criticizing a Republican president, especially for escalating. The latter predictions, however, are of less real-world interest, since if a dovish adviser advocates that a Democratic president should use force, for example, presumably other elites have already agreed that force is necessary. H3a: Counter-type adviser cues that counteract the party brand will have larger effects on ex ante support for war than those that reinforce the brand. A hawkish adviser's opposition to the use of force will lead to a larger decrease in support for war under a Democratic president than a dovish adviser's opposition. A dovish adviser's support for war will increase public support for fighting more than a hawkish adviser's support for war under a Republican president.
H3b: Democratic presidents who stay out of a conflict will get greater approval benefits from securing the support of a hawkish adviser. Republican presidents who fight benefit most from a dovish adviser supporting the use of force.
Research Design
I focus on testing the effects of adviser cues on opinion, and then briefly discuss how these cues provide strategic effects of presidential bargaining with advisers. To test the effects of cues, I employ a survey experiment, which offers internal validity, avoids problems of selection, and accounts for presidential expectations about approval (see Trager and Vavreck 2011, 532- 
Experimental Design
The experiment is designed to test how an adviser's statement affects support for the use of force and approval of the president's decision, while examining whether these effects depend on the president's partisanship, the adviser's hawkish or dovish reputation, and the president's ultimate decision about whether to stay out of the conflict or send US troops. The experiment unfolds in two stages. In the first stage, the president considers whether to use force; in the baseline condition, there is no statement from an adviser, but in the other four adviser treatment conditions, a key adviser, who can be either hawkish or dovish, makes a statement supporting or opposing force; respondents are then asked whether they support or oppose sending troops. The first stage is thus a 2x5 design, reflecting two conditions for the president's party (Democratic or Republican), and five adviser speech conditions (a baseline with no speech, a hawk supporting a troop deployment, a hawk opposing troops, a dove supporting troops, and a dove opposing troops). In the second stage, respondents learn whether the president sent troops or stayed out of the conflict, potentially with the support of or over the objection of an adviser; they also learn the outcome. Respondents are then asked whether they approve of the president's handling of the situation. The second stage is thus a 2x5x2 design. While most experiments provide all the information in a single stage, the two-stage approach allows the initial step to unfold under some uncertainty, which more closely resembles real-world cases in which the decision plays out amid debate and ambiguity about the decision and outcome. that the scenario is hypothetical. Next, respondents read that "A country sent its military to take over a smaller neighboring country. The country that has been attacked is important to U.S.
economic and security interests." Respondents are then told that the "The U.S. president, who is a [Democrat | Republican], debated extensively with his advisers about whether to send the military to push back the invaders, or stay out of the conflict." In all conditions, respondents are also told that "Best estimates suggest that if the United States intervened, most of the territory could be secured, but the U.S. would face significant armed resistance." These statements are intended to hold constant respondents' expectations about the likelihood of success and the expected costs, given arguments that these factors affect support for war (e.g., Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009) . Setting an expectation of significant armed resistance helps test whether adviser cues can move public opinion even in the face of potentially significant costs.
At this point, respondents were randomly assigned to an "adviser speech" condition that tests the effect of an adviser's support or opposition to the use of force (plus a control condition in which there is no comment by an adviser). In all conditions, however, the vignette mentions that the president "debated extensively with his advisers," to hold the possibility of debate constant across conditions. While other experiments in this vein have focused on support or opposition by parties in Congress (e.g., Trager and Vavreck 2011) , and thus employ partisan labels when describing opposition or support, this experiment focuses on presidential advisers, who are likely (though not guaranteed) to share the president's party. Nonetheless, advisers frequently vary along a hawk-dove dimension even within parties. In the four adviser speech conditions, the adviser's identity as a hawk or a dove is varied along with whether the adviser supports the use of force in this case. For example, in the condition where a hawkish adviser supports using force, respondents are told that "One of the president's key advisers, who usually takes a hawkish approach to foreign policy and has advocated the use of force in the past when many other advisers did not, opposed the use of force in this case." In the condition in which a usually-dovish adviser supports force, respondents are told, "One of the president's key advisers, who usually takes a dovish approach to foreign policy and has opposed the use of force in the past when other advisers did not, supported the use of force in the case." These two conditions-in which a usually-hawkish adviser opposes force and a usually-dovish adviser supports it-also comprise surprising or costly conditions, in which the adviser speaks against his or her own type, and thus are most likely to be informative and credible to voters. In the remaining two conditions, a usually-hawkish adviser supports force, and a usually-dovish adviser opposes. Although these adviser statements are more in line with expectations about the adviser's preferences, they still may be somewhat credible given the institutional source of the speech and the potential effects of the party brands. At the end of the first stage, summary bullet points appear, and respondents are asked, "If the attacker cannot be talked into withdrawing, would you support or oppose sending U.S. troops to push back the invaders?"
In the second stage, respondents learn the president's decision to either send troops or stay out of the conflict; the vignette notes whether this decision came "with the support of" or "over the objection of" the hawkish or dovish adviser. Respondents also learn the outcome of the conflict, which in all conditions ends with "the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory" (see also Kertzer and Brutger 2016 for a similar design choice). If the president sent troops, the vignette also mentions costs by specifying that "The U.S. suffered just under 100 casualties in the effort." 4 Following the vignette, and with summary bullet points visible, respondents are asked if they approve or disapprove of the president's handling of the situation; the resulting responses ranging from strongly disapprove to strongly approve on a 7-point scale.
Results
The primary focus of this paper is on how advisers matter, and thus H1, which examines whether adviser support or opposition affects support for war in the first stage (H1a) and approval once the president announces a decision (H1b), regardless of the president's partisanship or the adviser's reputation. I therefore aggregate the conditions in which the adviser supports force or opposes force. For Stage 1, I report the percentage of respondents who support a troop deployment (including those who lean toward support), and for Stage 2, I report the percentage who approve of the president's handling of the situation (with the scale collapsed so that those who strongly, somewhat, or lean approve are coded as approving).
The left side of Table 1a shows the effect of adviser statements on support for war in Stage 1, before the decision. An adviser's opposition to sending troops (N=1185) results in a 9
percentage point decrease in support for the use of force, compared to the condition in which advisers support sending troops (N=1222), a highly statistically significant difference given the aggregated cell size. Notably, an adviser's explicit statement of support is substantively and statistically indistinguishable from the baseline condition in which advisers say nothing (N=598).
This result holds consistently across the analysis: support does not provide much in the way of a boost in support for war or approval compared to silence, suggesting that advisers are expected to support the president most of the time. On the right side of Table 1a , once the president has announced his decision (H1b), approval of his handling of the situation depends on whether he did so with the support of or over the opposition of his advisers. We cannot simply examine the effect of adviser support or opposition for a particular action, however, because differences in approval could arise from either the adviser statement or respondents' views about the choice to use force. To assess the effect of adviser support, rather, requires the difference in approval between sending troops and staying out across both adviser speech conditions (support or opposition to the use of force). 5 Mathematically, this difference-in-differences can be expressed as:
[(Send Troops | Adviser Supports) -(Stay Out | Adviser Supports)] -[(Send Troops | Adviser Opposes) -(Stay Out | Adviser Opposes)]
As the right side of Table 1a shows, this difference-in-differences, i.e. the effect of sending troops with adviser support vs. without, is a highly significant 19 percentage point gain in approval. Presidents who decide to stay out of the conflict when their advisers opposed sending troops see 9 percentage points higher approval (and over the 50% mark) compared to those who stay out when an adviser supported sending troops. When presidents send troops, nearly the mirror image occurs in approval, with 10 percentage point higher approval for those who send troops with their adviser's support, compared to opposition (both results are again highly statistically significant). Another way to view this result appears in Table 1b, which aggregates the conditions in which the president acted according to his adviser's recommendation (sending troops when the adviser supported troops, or staying out when the adviser opposed troops) and those in which the president acts against the adviser's statement.
Acting against advisers results in a 10 percentage point drop in approval compared to the condition in which the adviser explicitly supports the action. 6 Overall, Table 2 (with approximately 300 respondents per condition). The first feature of interest is that in the baseline condition, with no specific adviser speech, there is more support for sending US troops when the president is a Democrat (63%) rather than a Republican (55%, p=.07, two-tailed). This overall difference in support for using force under a Democratic versus a Republican president also appears in the full sample (60% support for a Democratic president, 53% for a Republican), and is highly statistically significant (p=.0001) given the large sample size. Another consistent feature of the results is the overall similarity in support levels for the baseline and supportive conditions, across party and adviser types.
The next two conditions explore the effect of a hawkish adviser's speech. Again, however, we cannot simply compare supportive statements from two different types of advisers (hawkish vs. dovish), because this comparison would not disentangle respondents' views of hawkish or dovish elites, or the fact of support. The most relevant comparison is the difference between a given adviser's support for the use of force versus opposition. We can think of this difference or "swing" as the "price" of obtaining the support of that adviser, or the upside to preventing that adviser from making a statement opposing the use of force. We can then compare these differences across adviser types, to assess whether ensuring a hawkish or dovish adviser's support is more valuable.
In the upper half of Table 2 , if a usually-hawkish adviser supports using force, the effect as compared to baseline is neither large nor statistically significant for either a Democratic or a Republican president, but the 4 percentage point increase in support for sending troops under a Democratic president does widen the gap between support for a deployment under a Democratic versus a Republican president to 11 percentage points, a gap which is now highly statistically significant (p= 0.004). Per H2a, if a usually-hawkish adviser opposes using force in this case, however, support for sending troops drops to 53% for a Democratic president, a drop of 10 percentage points from baseline (p=.02). The "swing" in support for sending troops from a hawkish adviser who opposes a deployment to a hawkish adviser who supports is 14 percentage points (p=.0004). Put differently, a president who wants to avoid sending troops can substantially reduce support for using force by convincing a hawkish adviser to oppose a deployment. The effect of a hawkish adviser who comes out against using force is expected to be large, especially for a Democrat, because all three mechanisms are in place: the hawk is engaging in surprising speech; opposing a potential presidential initiative from within the president's inner circle (even if the president has not announced a decision); and making a statement that helps counteract the stereotype of the president's party brand, giving a Democratic president cover should he decide not to use force. Interestingly, and in contrast to H3a, under a
Republican president, a hawkish adviser who opposes using force in this case also has a negative, statistically significant effect (-9 percentage points, p=.03) on support for sending troops, which helps account for the fact that the partisan gap when a hawk opposes war remains 6 percentage points, although it is no longer statistically significant. Hawks who oppose using force can still have an effect on support for war under a Republican president.
The lower half of Table 2 reports similar comparisons when dovish advisers support or oppose the use of force. Dovish advisers, however, do not appear to have large effects on support for war, even when they speak against type. A usually dovish adviser, who "has opposed the use of force in the past when many other advisers did not," does not appreciably affect support for war even when he speaks out in favor of using force in this case, although the baseline partisan gap does fall below statistical significance. A dovish adviser who opposes war has slightly larger, negative effects on support, illustrating that any opposition from an adviser can depress support (per H1a). The swing from dovish support to dovish opposition does not result in a statistically significant change in support for a president of either party. In the very bottom row of Table 2 , the difference-in-differences between the hawk swing (support-oppose) and the dove swing (support-oppose) is 9 percentage points for a Democratic president, and just at the threshold of statistical significance at the p=.1 level. The difference-in-differences in adviser swings for a Republican president is a (non-significant) 3 percentage points.
Overall, the first stage of the experiment suggests that advisers matter even when taking partisanship into account; that hawkish advisers have a larger effect than dovish advisers for presidents of both parties; and that hawkish advisers are particularly important under Democratic presidents (in line with H3a). If a Democratic president wants to avoid sending troops-i.e., play to type-convincing a hawk to move from supporting to opposing a deployment results in a larger reduction in public support for using force, a swing from two-thirds support to just over half supporting, than a similar shift in a dovish adviser's stance.
The importance of advisers persists in the second stage, once the president's decision and the conflict's outcome are announced. Tables 3a and 3b present the results in terms of approval.
Looking across the tables, from the "stay out" decision to the "send troops" decision, illustrates how adviser speech affects the incentives for each president to send troops; looking down the columns shows the effect of adviser speech for each decision. Results for Democratic presidents, shown in Table 3a , again reflect a baseline gap between sending troops and staying out.
Approval for Democratic presidents who send troops is 59%, whereas Democrats who stay out get 47%, a statistically significant gap (p=.04). This gap also holds in the full sample: across all conditions for Democrats, there is a smaller gap (53% approval for sending troops vs. 46% for staying out, p=.006). As shown in the table's top set of results, which report the effects of hawkish adviser speech, when a hawkish adviser explicitly supports sending troops, the gap in approval between staying out and sending troops for a Democratic president widens to 21 percentage points, with 41% approval at the stay out decision and 61% if there is an intervention.
In contrast, if a hawkish adviser opposes sending troops, the gap is reversed: 54% approve of a Democratic president who stays out if a hawkish adviser opposed sending troops, while 43% approve if the president sends troops over the hawkish adviser's objection. The gap between staying out and sending troops swings to 11 percentage points in favor of staying out in the hawkish adviser opposing force scenario (and a significant and negative 23 percentage point reduction in the gap favoring a troop deployment, as compared to the no-speech baseline). The difference-in-differences in the stay out vs. send troops gap when the hawk supports vs. opposes force is a highly significant 31 percentage points. A hawkish adviser who comes out against a deployment can provide cover in terms of approval, per H3b.
Similar comparisons for dovish advisers do not yield effects nearly as large or significant
for Democratic presidents The right-hand side of the very bottom row of the table reports the difference-in-differences between the effect of a hawk shift in support for using force vs.
opposition and a similar dove shift in support vs. opposition on the overall approval gap between staying out and sending troops. The hawkish adviser's swing to supporting force has a much larger effect on the approval gap (31 percentage point increase in the approval gap, favoring sending troops) than the dove's swing (8 percentage point increase in the approval gap); the difference-in-differences is 24 percentage points in the effect on the approval gap favoring force (p=.04).
Looking down the columns of Table 3a , at the stay out decision-where a Democratic president acts according to type-there is, as mentioned, a statistically significant swing of 13 percentage points in approval when the hawk shifts from support to opposition, but no similar effect for a dovish swing (though the difference-in-differences at the stay out decision, in bottom row on the left-hand side, is not statistically significant). Interestingly, hawkish advisers also significantly affect approval if a Democratic president sends troops. If a Democratic president sends troops over the objection of a hawkish adviser, approval dips to the low 40s, almost indistinguishable from staying out over the objection of a hawkish adviser. At the send troops decision (middle column, very bottom row), the difference-in differences for the effect of a shift from support to opposition for a hawkish vs. dovish adviser is 14 percentage points (p=.08). A hawkish adviser can affect approval of Democratic presidents for any decision.
The pattern for Republican presidents, in 
Presidents, Advisers, and Pulling and Hauling Revisited
The importance of adviser cues provides presidents with a strategic incentive to manage the cues that emerge from within their own inner circle. But the theory goes a step beyond the implications of many survey experiments that leaders anticipate the most effective cues that will move public opinion and recruit messengers, tailor messages, or choose policies accordingly.
Rather, in this argument, bargaining with elites-an "elite coalition game"-serves as an intermediate step between leaders' interactions with other states and with the public, allowing leaders to make policy concessions or side payments to particular elites in order to manage the configuration of elite cues that reaches the public. The survey experiment identifies those whose support will be most worthwhile to bargain for, and the "price" leaders must pay, since presumably a larger opinion "swing" is more costly to obtain.
This bargaining often occurs behind the scenes, however, so that the effects turned up by the experiment are not observed in public but rather inside the proverbial Situation Room or Oval Office. These effects suggest an important methodological point about survey experiments:
the real-world effects of public opinion experiments may manifest in elite bargaining and strategic behavior by leaders. The utility of the experiment is not necessarily reflected, then, in how often we see adviser cues or major events involving advisers, such as resignations.
Observed adviser opposition will be rare, but media interest in adviser positions, as well as "pulling and hauling" among advisers, will be frequent. Observing these real-world effects can be challenging, precisely because they are the product of strategic behavior and thus designed to avoid cues from emerging. As Schultz (2001b) notes in the context of audience costs, case studies are a useful way to find the imprint of such strategic behavior.
The theory and findings also make arguments about "pulling and hauling" more predictive, by generating hypotheses about how leaders manage advisers in order to ensure the most favorable constellation of cues. Democratic presidents who want to stay out of a conflict or pursue a lower level of escalation are likely to be most concerned with obtaining buy-in from their most hawkish adviser, and thus to pursue military strategies that move in the direction of their most hawkish adviser. Republicans who wish to fight are likely to be concerned about placating their most dovish adviser (in the sense of being least favorably disposed toward using force, even if they are not "doves" in the traditional sense). Criticism from a dovish adviser, while in some senses less surprising, will have institutional credibility, and might contribute to the image of Republicans as too bellicose. In addition to the effect on public opinion, these cues will also provide information to members of Congress. Presidents who hope to obtain the endorsement of the opposition party (or prevent partisan dissensus) would benefit from the signal sent by the sign-on of surprising administration insiders. Presidents cannot go too far, however, because criticism from members of their own party would be credible (Baum and Groeling 2010) .
Elites can impose costs on the president in exchange for their support (or for refraining from criticism) by forcing the president to either spend political capital, or make more direct concessions that affect the final form of the policy or its implementation. One might argue that a president from a particular party would not be willing to bargain in either direction (with a dovish or hawkish adviser), given his or her own proclivities one way or the other. But the argument assumes that the choice for the use of force is left up to the president, and side payments are on related but significant aspects of the decision, such as the deployment size, timing, or strategy, or even non-military payments in the case of a decision to stay out, that a president may be willing to concede. Elite bargaining is likely to pull the president away from his ideal-point, but bargaining successfully can allow him to pursue a version of his desired policy with relative autonomy. If the president chooses to fight, military strategy will likely be the result of compromises among elites with divergent preferences.
To illustrate these elite-level mechanisms, consider a brief illustrative case: Barack Obama's decision to "surge" troops into Afghanistan in December 2009, when the public displayed war-weariness, and yet Obama forged a fragile elite coalition that allowed him to escalate. 8 Escalation decisions are useful for isolating the potential cuing effects of elite advisers, because the president's information advantage shrinks once a conflict is under way, and there is also likely a secular downward trend in public opinion as the conflict drags on (Gartner and Segura 1998) . Given that the public has had time to form opinions about the conflict and is likely to exhibit war-weariness, this scenario presents a difficult test for an argument that the president can manage elite opinion to continue or even escalate the war.
Obama's surge suggests that the president can generate leeway in the face of public warweariness as long as he keeps elites on board, and that as a Democrat, he was most concerned with his hawkish advisers. The military publicly pushed for more troops than Obama wanted to send and to use them in a counterinsurgency strategy about which he was ambivalent. There were also divisions within Obama's national security team, which contained two unusually Gates might resign if Obama chose an option to send only 10,000 trainers, Obama said, "That would be the difficult part, because Bob Gates is…there's no stronger member of my national security team" (quoted in Woodward 2010, 304) . While Gates influenced Obama's substantive views of the debate, the need to maintain the support of Gates for his chosen policy, and the Pentagon more generally, was also a significant concern.
Ultimately, Obama decided to send 30,000 troops-not as high as the 40,000 McChrystal originally requested, but enough to make the military feel it had gotten a significant portion of what it wanted. Most accounts suggest that Obama was reluctant to send a substantial new contingent of troops (e.g., Woodward 2010, 304) . Obama also compromised on military strategy. Souring on the idea of a long-term commitment to counterinsurgency and nation-building in Afghanistan, he seemed to favor a limited approach, though perhaps not the full Biden counterterrorism option. He made clear his approach was a departure from the previous emphasis on counterinsurgency, but he had nodded just enough to "elements of a counterinsurgency strategy" to mollify the military. As Woodward recounts, Petraeus said he would support the president, and "shifted into cheerleading mode" (Woodward 2010, 325-327) .
Thus the need to keep the military and his most hawkish advisers on board led Obama to shift off his ideal point, without going all the way toward the military's preference. As Peter wanted" (Feaver 2011, 123) . Obama obtained the buy-in of hawks inside his administration for a lower-level military effort-even as he shifted that effort in a somewhat more aggressive direction-just as in the experimental results, the support of a hawk for a Democratic president's decision to stay out was beneficial. Obama was careful to publicly demonstrate the united support of his team-including the skeptical hawks-which appeared together at the December 1, 2009 speech at West Point in which Obama announced the policy; officials also testified before Congress on the new plan. Among the public, more than half of Republicans and about half of Democrats supported the troop increase (Jacobson 2010, 603) .
Conclusion
Despite the president's discretion to choose advisers, tensions often roil administrations, particularly during decisions to use force. This paper has shown that the administration debates can have political consequences, but that presidents can manage these consequences strategically, keeping leverage over policy largely within the Beltway. As insiders who are close to the president, advisers can raise the political stakes, provide political cover, or inflict political damage on the president in systematic ways.
The paper also highlights the political origins of the elite consensus and dissensus long shown to be an important driver of public opinion. Anticipated public reaction plays a role, but public opinion often does its work through elite-mediate channels. Intra-elite bargaining can shape the nature and volume of the cues the public ultimately hears, both directly and by influencing other cues emanating from Congress. This bargaining can affect the details of policy that escape even the attentive public's notice but can significantly influence the costs, duration, To summarize:
• A country sent its military to take over a smaller neighboring country.
• The U.S. president is a [Democrat | Republican].
• The president debated with his advisers. A country sent its military to take over a smaller neighboring country. The country that has been attacked is important to U.S. economic and security interests.
The U.S. president, who is a [Democrat | Republican], debated extensively with his advisers about whether to send the military to push back the invaders, or stay out of the conflict. Best estimates suggest that if the United States intervened, most of the territory could be secured, but the U.S. would face significant armed resistance.
The attacking country continued to invade.
Stage 2:
In the end, the [Democratic | Republican] U.S. president decided to send troops to push back the invaders. The U.S. suffered just under 100 casualties in the effort. The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory.
Hawkish adviser advocates force/Intervene
Stage 1:
A country sent its military to take over a smaller neighboring country. The country that has been attacked is important to U.S. economic and security interests.
The attacking country continued to invade. One of the president's key advisers, who usually takes a hawkish approach to foreign policy and has advocated the use of force in the past when many other advisers did not, supported the use of force in this case.
Stage 2:
In the end, the [Democratic | Republican] U.S. president decided to send troops to push back the invaders, with the support of his hawkish adviser. The U.S. suffered just under 100 casualties in the effort. The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory.
Dovish adviser opposes force/Intervene
The attacking country continued to invade. One of the president's key advisers, who usually takes a dovish approach to foreign policy and has opposed the use of force in the past when many other advisers did not, opposed the use of force in this case.
Stage 2:
In the end, the [Democratic | Republican] U.S. president decided to send troops to push back the invaders, over the objection of his dovish adviser. The U.S. suffered just under 100 casualties in the effort. The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory.
Appendix 2: MTurk Pilot Experiment Experimental Design
A pilot version of the experiment was run in August 2015 via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service.
1 The design is similar to that of the experiment described in the main text, with four main differences. First, the pilot unfolds all in one stage, giving respondents information about the advisers' statement, the president's decision, and the outcome, and then asking about approval of the president's decision. Second, the pilot omits the discussion of expected armed resistance and holds actual costs constant at zero casualties. Following Kertzer and Brutger (2016) , in all conditions in which the president sends troops, I specified that the US did not lose any troops (in addition to holding the outcome of the conflict constant across all conditions, with the attacking country controlling 20 percent of the territory regardless of whether or not the president ultimately sends troops). As Kertzer and Brutger point out, specifying zero casualties in the send-troops conditions holds the costs constant across all conditions, rendering all the conditions logically equivalent, though not lexically equivalent. This design choice is likely to bias support for sending troops upward, however. The experiment reported in the main text adds the expectation of "significant armed resistance" as well as casualties in the send-troops conditions, to show that the adviser cues matter even in the face of expected and actual costs.
A third difference is sample size, which is large (1,690) but still only just over half that of the SSI study reported in the main text. Fourth, consistent with the literature on MTurk samples (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012), the MTurk pilot study skews more liberal than the SSI study reported in the main text (difference in means for both party identification and ideology show the MTurk study to have significantly more liberal and Democratic respondents). Although the study is primarily interested in treatment effects-whether advisers can affect approval-the more liberal sample in the pilot study may also affect baseline preferences for staying out of a conflict.
The pilot study was run in two stages. Experiment 1, run on a sample of 953 MTurk respondents, focused only on "costly speech" conditions where the adviser goes against expectations (e.g., a hawkish adviser opposing force, or a dovish adviser advocating force). I then ran a follow-up experiment, Experiment 2, with the "cheap talk" conditions, using a sample of 737 MTurk respondents. Tests indicate no statistically significant differences in baseline approval across the two experiments; I subsequently pooled the two experiments, resulting in a sample of 1,690 respondents with five speech conditions (baseline, two costly speech conditions, and two cheap talk conditions), in addition to variation in the president's party and the decision about whether to use force. Because both experiments had a baseline condition, the pooled results have double the number of respondents in the baseline condition.
The basic structure of both (now-pooled) pilot experiments is very similar to the main experiment.
2 After the same introductory prompt described in the main text, respondents read that "A country sent its military to take over a smaller neighboring country. The country that has been attacked is important to U.S. economic and security interests." They are then told that the "The U.S. president, who is a [Democrat | Republican], debated extensively with his advisers about whether to send the military to push back the invaders, or stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade." Respondents are then randomly assigned to an adviser speech condition-baseline, one of the two cheap talk conditions, or one of the two costly speech conditions, totaling the same five conditions in the main experiment. Then respondents learn the president's decision to either send troops or stay out of the conflict; the vignette notes whether this decision came with the support or opposition of the hawkish or dovish adviser. As discussed above, the final line holds constant the outcome of the conflict. If the president did not send troops, the vignette reports that "The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory." If the president sent troops, the vignette ends by specifying that "The U.S. did not lose any troops in the conflict and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory." Following the vignette, respondents are asked if they approve or disapprove of the president's handling of the situation, with responses ranging from strongly disapprove to strongly approve on a 7-point scale. The pooled experiments result in a 2x2x5 structure, analogous to Stage 2 of the main experiment. Tables A1a-b and Tables A2a-b. Table A1a compares presidential approval for the two decisions (staying out vs. sending troops) across three adviser conditions: baseline, when the adviser supports sending troops, and when the adviser opposes sending troops, the same comparisons shown on the right side of Table 1a in the main text. The pattern is quite similar, although approval levels are somewhat higher. At the stay out decision, approval is a highly significant 12 percentage points lower if the adviser supported the use of force than when the adviser opposed it, and more than two-thirds of respondents approve of the president's decision to stay out if the adviser opposed sending troops. At the send troops decision (again, where in this pilot version, casualties are specified at zero), the approval pattern flips, so that if the adviser supported sending troops, approval is (highly significant) 13 percentage points higher than if the adviser opposed it, and now nearly two-thirds approve of the president sending troops. In Table A1b , the conditions are combined to show that approval is 12 percentage points higher when the president acts in accordance with the adviser's recommendation than when the president acts against the adviser (again, a highly significant difference). The substantive pattern and effect sizes are comparable to those in the main text (Tables 1a and 1b) . Tables A2a and A2b show the results broken down by party and adviser type (analogous  to Tables 3a and 3b in the main text). These results should be taken with caution because cell sizes become small in many cases (with approximately 50-70 respondents in some adviser speech conditions). The results for a Democratic president, in Table A2a , suggest that hawkish advisers have a significant effect on approval for both the stay out and send troops decision; unlike in the main study, dovish advisers have a somewhat significant effect on approval for a Democratic president who sends troops (though again, casualties are held constant at zero in this experiment).
Results

Results are summarized in
For Republican presidents, Table A2b shows larger effects for obtaining a dovish adviser's support, although the effect is only somewhat significant at the stay out decision and does not reach significance at the send troop decision. The results for Republican presidents, however, are somewhat clouded by the effect of hawkish advisers, whose speech either in support or opposition to sending troops leads to a somewhat significant drop in approval when the president ultimately sends troops (15 percentage points if the hawkish adviser supported troops and 13 percentage points if the hawkish adviser opposed). At the stay out decision, there is similarly little difference between the effect on approval of a hawkish adviser supporting or opposing force, and both conditions are nearly identical to the high (70%) approval for staying out in the baseline condition. Perhaps in this more liberal sample, hawkish advisers are mistrusted, and the decision to send troops or not swamps the effects of hawkish adviser speech. As mentioned, however, dovish advisers do influence approval for Republican presidents and the endorsement of a dovish adviser at least maintains approval at 65%, nearly identical to the baseline level for a Republican who fights.
Overall, the basic contours of the results are similar, especially where presidents wish to play to type. Democratic presidents who wish to play to type-i.e. stay out-benefit from the endorsement of a hawkish adviser, and can get approval as high as 69% if staying out comes with a hawkish adviser's opposition to using force. Republican presidents who wish to play to type-i.e. to send troops-would do well to have their hawkish advisers stay silent, and the endorsement of a dovish adviser can at least prop up support.
